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Abstract
In this paper, we study the problem of computing U -statistics of degree 2, i.e.,
quantities that come in the form of averages over pairs of data points, in the local
model of differential privacy (LDP). The class of U -statistics covers many statistical
estimates of interest, including Gini mean difference, Kendall’s tau coefficient and Area
under the ROC Curve (AUC), as well as empirical risk measures for machine learning
problems such as ranking, clustering and metric learning. We first introduce an LDP
protocol based on quantizing the data into bins and applying randomized response, which
guarantees an -LDP estimate with a Mean Squared Error (MSE) of O(1/
√
n) under
regularity assumptions on the U -statistic or the data distribution. We then propose
a specialized protocol for AUC based on a novel use of hierarchical histograms that
achieves MSE of O(α3/n2) for arbitrary data distribution. We also show that 2-party
secure computation allows to design a protocol with MSE of O(1/n2), without any
assumption on the kernel function or data distribution and with total communication
linear in the number of users n. Finally, we evaluate the performance of our protocols
through experiments on synthetic and real datasets.
1 Introduction
The problem of collecting aggregate statistics from a set of n users in a way that individual
contributions remain private even from the data analysts has recently attracted a lot of
interest. In the popular local model of differential privacy (LDP) (Duchi et al., 2013; Kairouz
et al., 2014), users apply a local randomizer to their private input before sending it to an
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untrusted aggregator. In this context, most work has focused on computing quantities that
are separable across individual users, such as sums and histograms (see Bassily and Smith,
2015; Wang et al., 2017; Kulkarni et al., 2019; Cormode et al., 2018; Bassily et al., 2017, and
references therein).
In this paper, we study the problem of privately computing U -statistics of degree 2, which
generalize sample mean statistics to averages over pairs of data points. Let x1, . . . , xn be a set
of n data points drawn i.i.d. from an unknown ditribution µ over a (discrete or continuous)
domain X . The U -statistic of degree 2 with kernel f , given by Uf,n = 2n(n−1)
∑
i<j f(xi, xj), is
an unbiased estimate of Uf = Ex,x′∼µ[f(x, x′)] with minimum variance (Hoeffding, 1948). The
class of U -statistics covers many statistical estimates of interest, including sample variance,
Gini mean difference, Kendall’s tau coefficient, Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney hypothesis test and
Area under the ROC Curve (AUC) (Lee, 1990; Mann and Whitney, 1947; Faivishevsky and
Goldberger, 2008). They are also commonly used as empirical risk measures for machine
learning problems such as ranking, clustering and metric learning (Kar et al., 2013; Clémençon
et al., 2016).
Interestingly, private estimation of U -statistics in the LDP model for arbitrary kernel
functions f and data distributions µ cannot be straightforwardly addressed by resorting to
standard local randomizers such as the Laplace mechanism or randomized response. Indeed,
one cannot apply the local randomizer to the terms of the sum based on the sensitivity of f
(as each term is shared across two users), and perturbing the inputs themselves can lead to
large errors when passed through the (potentially discontinuous) function f .
In this work, we design and analyze several protocols for computing U -statistics with
privacy and utility guarantees. More precisely:
1. We introduce a generic LDP protocol based on quantizing the data into k bins and
applying k-ary randomized response. We show that under an assumption on either the
kernel function f or the data distribution µ, the aggregator can construct an -LDP
estimate of Uf,n with a Mean Squared Error (MSE) of O(1/
√
n).
2. For the case of the AUC on a domain of size 2α, whose kernel does not satisfy the
regularity assumption required by our previous protocol, we design a specialized protocol
based on hierarchical histograms that achieves MSE O(α2 log(1/δ)/n2) under (, δ)-
LDP and O(α3/n2) under -LDP, for arbitrary data distribution.
3. Under a slight relaxation of the local model in which we allow pairs of users i and j to
compute a randomized version of f(xi, xj) with 2-party secure computation, we show
that we can design a protocol with MSE of O(1/n2), without any assumption on the
kernel function or data distribution and with constant communication for each of the n
users.
4. To evaluate the practical performance of the proposed protocols, we present some
experiments on synthetic and real datasets for the task of computing AUC and Kendall’s
tau coefficient.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives some background on U -statistics
and local differential privacy. In Section 3 we present a generic LDP protocol based on
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randomizing quantized inputs. Section 4 introduces a specialized LDP protocol for computing
the Area under the ROC Curve (AUC). In Section 5, we introduce a generic protocol which
operates in a slightly relaxed version of the LDP model where users can run secure 2-party
computation. We present some numerical experiments in Section 6, and discuss some future
work in Section 7.
2 Background
In this section, we introduce some background on U -statistics and local differential privacy.
2.1 U-Statistics
2.1.1 Definition and Properties
Let µ be an (unknown) distribution over an input space X and f : X 2 → R be a pairwise
function (assumed to be symmetric for simplicity) referred to as the kernel. Given a sample
S = {xi}ni=1 of n observations drawn from µ, we are interested in estimating the following
population quantity:
Uf = EX1,X2∼µ[f(X1, X2)]. (1)
Definition 1 (Hoeffding, 1948). The U-statistic of degree 2 with kernel f is given by
Uf,n =
1(
n
2
)∑
i<j
f(xi, xj). (2)
Uf,n is an unbiased estimate of Uf . Denoting by ζ1 = Var(f(x1, X2) | x1)) and ζ2 =
Var(f(X1, X2), its variance is given by (Hoeffding, 1948; Lee, 1990):
Var(Uf,n) =
1(
n
2
)(2(n− 2)ζ1 + ζ2). (3)
The above variance is of O(1/n) and is optimal among all unbiased estimators of Uf that
can be computed from S. This incurs a complex dependence structure, as each data point
appears in n − 1 pairs. The statistical behavior of U -statistics can be investigated using
linearization techniques (Hoeffding, 1948) and decoupling methods (de la Pena and Giné,
1999), which provide tools to reduce their analysis to that of standard i.i.d. averages. One
may refer to (Lee, 1990) for asymptotic theory of U -statistics, to (Van Der Vaart, 2000)
(Chapter 12 therein) and (de la Pena and Giné, 1999) for nonasymptotic results, and to
(Clémençon et al., 2008, 2016) for an account of U -statistics in the context of machine learning
and empirical risk minimization.
2.1.2 Motivating Examples
U -statistics are commonly used as point estimators of various global properties of distributions,
as well as in statistical hypothesis testing (Lee, 1990; Mann and Whitney, 1947; Faivishevsky
and Goldberger, 2008). They also come up as empirical risk measures in machine learning
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problems with pairwise loss functions such as bipartite ranking, metric learning and clustering.
Below, we give some concrete examples of U -statistics of broad interest to motivate our
private protocols.
Gini mean difference. This is a classic measure of dispersion which is often seen as
more informative than the variance for some distributions (Yitzhaki, 2003). Letting X ⊂ R,
it is defined as
G =
1(
n
2
)∑
i<j
|xi − xj|, (4)
which is a U -statistic of degree 2 with kernel f(xi, xj) = |xi − xj|. Gini coefficient, the most
commonly used measure of inequality, is obtained by multiplying G by (n− 1)/2∑ni=1 xi.
Remark 1. The variance of a sample, obtained by replacing the absolute difference by the
squared difference in (4), is also a U -statistic. However we note that computing the variance
can be achieved by computing two sums of locally computable variables (xi and x2i ), which can
be done with existing LDP protocols.
Rényi-2 entropy. Also known as collision entropy, this provides a measure of entropy
between Shannon’s entropy and min entropy which is used in many applications involving
discrete distributions (see Acharya et al., 2015, and references therein). It is given by
H2 = − ln
(
1(
n
2
)∑
i<j
I[xi = xj]
)
. (5)
The expression inside the log is a U -statistic of degree 2 with kernel f(xi, xj) = I[xi = xj].
Kendall’s tau coefficient. This statistic measures the ordinal association between two
variables and is often used as a test statistic to answer questions such as “does a higher salary
make one happier?”. In learning to rank applications, it is used to evaluate the extent to
which a predicted ranking correlates with the (human-generated) gold standard (see e.g.,
Joachims, 2002; Lapata, 2006). Formally, assuming continuous variables for simplicity, let
X ⊂ R2 and S = {xi = (yi, zi)}ni=1. For any i < j, the pairs xi = (yi, zi) and xj = (yj, zj) are
said be concordant if (yi > yj) ∧ (zi > zj) or (yi < yj) ∧ (zi < zj), and discordant otherwise.
Let C and D be the number of concordant and discordant pairs in S. Kendall rank correlation
coefficient is defined as:
τ =
C −D
C +D
=
1(
n
2
)∑
i<j
sign(yi − yj) sign(zi − zj), (6)
which is a U -statistic of degree 2 with kernel f(xi, xj) = sign(yi − yj) sign(zi − zj).1
Area under the ROC curve (AUC). In binary classification with class imbalance,
the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) gives the true positive rate with respect to the
false positive rate of a predictor at each possible decision threshold. The AUC is a popular
summary of the ROC curve which gives a single, threshold-independent measure of the
classifier goodness which corresponds to the probability that the predictor assigns a higher
score to a randomly chosen positive point than to a randomly chosen negative one. AUC
1One can easily modify the kernel to account for ties.
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is widely used as an evaluation metric in machine learning (Bradley, 1997; Herschtal and
Raskutti, 2004). Formally, let X ⊂ R×{−1, 1} and S = {xi = (si, yi)}ni=1 where for each data
point i, si ∈ R is the score assigned to point i and yi ∈ {−1, 1} is its label. For convenience,
let S+ = {si : yi = 1} and S− = {si : yi = −1} and let n+ = |S+| and n− = |S−|. The AUC
is given by
AUC =
1
n+n−
∑
si∈S+
∑
sj∈S−
I[si > sj], (7)
where I[σ] is an indicator variable outputting 1 if the predicate σ is true and 0 otherwise.
Up to a
(
n
2
)
/n+n− factor, it is easy to see that AUC is a U -statistic of degree 2 with kernel
f(xi, xj) = I[si > sj ∧ yi > yj] + I[si < sj ∧ yi < yj].
Machine learning with pairwise losses. Many machine learning problems involve
loss functions that operate on pairs of points (Kar et al., 2013; Clémençon et al., 2016). This
is the case for instance in metric learning (Bellet et al., 2015), bipartite ranking (Clémençon
et al., 2008) and clustering (Clémençon, 2014). Empirical risk minimization problems have
therefore the following generic form:
min
θ∈Θ
1(
n
2
)∑
i<j
`θ(xi, xj), (8)
where θ ∈ Θ are model parameters. The objective function in (8), as well as its gradient, are
U -statistics of degree 2 with kernels `θ and ∇θ`θ respectively.
2.2 Local Differential Privacy
The classic centralized model of differential privacy assumed the presence of a trusted
aggregator which processes the private information of individuals and releases a perturbed
version of the result. The local model instead captures the setting where individuals do not
trust the aggregator and randomize their input locally before sharing it. This model has
received wide industrial adoption (Erlingsson et al., 2014; Fanti et al., 2016; Differential
Privacy Team, Apple, 2017; Ding et al., 2017).
Definition 2 (Duchi et al., 2013). A local randomizer R is (, δ)-locally differentially private
(LDP) if for all pairs x, x′ ∈ X and all possible output O in the range of R, we have
Pr[R(x) = O] ≤ ePr[R(x′) = O] + δ.
The special case δ = 0 is called pure -LDP.
Most work in LDP aims to compute quantities that are separable across individual inputs,
such as sums and histograms (see Bassily and Smith, 2015; Wang et al., 2017; Kulkarni et al.,
2019; Cormode et al., 2018; Bassily et al., 2017, and references therein). In contrast, our goal
is to design LDP protocols for computing U -statistics, where each term involves a pair of
inputs.
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Algorithm 1: LDP algorithm based on quantization and private histograms
Public Parameters: Privacy budget , quantization scheme pi, number of bins k.
Input: (xi ∈ X )i∈[n]
Output: Estimate Ûf,n of Uf
1 for each user i ∈ [n] do
2 Form quantized input pi(xi) ∈ [k]
3 For β = k/(k + e − 1), generate x˜i ∈ [k] such that
P (x˜i = i) =
{
1− β for i = pi(xi),
β/k for i 6= pi(xi), (9)
4 Send x˜i to the aggregator
5 end
6 Return Ûf,n computed from x˜1, . . . , x˜n and β
3 Generic LDP Protocol from Quantization
Discrete inputs. We first consider the case of discrete inputs taking one of k values. The
possible values of the kernel function can be written as a matrix A ∈ Rk×k where Aij = f(i, j).
In this case, we can set the local randomizer R to be k-ary randomized response to generate
a perturbed version R(xi) of each input xi. Let ei denote the vector of length k with a one in
the i-th position and 0 elsewhere. For each perturbed input in one-hot encoding form eR(xi)
we can deduce an unbiased estimate of exi . As the discrete U -statistic is a linear function of
each of these vectors, computing it on these unbiased estimates gives an unbiased estimate
Ûf,n which can be written as:
Ûf,n =
1(
n
2
) ∑
1≤i<j≤n
f̂A(R(xi),R(xj)),
and is itself a U -statistic with kernel f̂A given by
f̂A(R(x1),R(x2)) = (1− β)−2(eR(x1) − b)TA(eR(x2) − b),
where 1− β is the probability of returning the true input in k-ary randomized response (see
Eq. 9) and b is the vector of length k with every entry β/k. Details and analysis of this
process, leveraging results on the variance of U -statistics (Hoeffding, 1948; Lee, 1990), can be
found in Section A.1 of the supplementary material. The resulting bounds on the variance of
Ûf,n are summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. If f(x, x′) ∈ [0, 1] for all x, x′, then
Var(Ûf,n) ≤ 1
n(1− β)2 +
(1 + β)2
2n(n− 1)(1− β)4 .
In order to achieve -LDP with a fixed k this becomes,
Var(Ûf,n) ≈ (1 + k/)
2
n
+
(1 + k/)4
2n2
≈ k
2
n2
,
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Continuous inputs. For U -statistics on discrete domains, e.g. Renyi-2 entropy, the
above strategy can be applied directly. Possibly more importantly however, this then leads
to a natural protocol for the continuous case. In this protocol (see Algorithm 1), the
local randomizer proceeds by quantizing the input into k bins (for instance using simple or
randomized rounding) before applying the previous procedure.
There are two sources of error in this protocol. The first one is due to the randomization
needed to satisfy LDP in the quantized domain as bounded in Theorem 1. The second
source of error is due to quantization. In order to control this error in a nontrivial way,
we rely on an assumption on the kernel function (namely, that it is Lipschitz) or the data
distribution (namely, that it has Lipschitz density). Under these assumptions and using an
appropriate variant of the kernel function on the quantized domain, we show that we can
bound the error with respect to the original domain by a term in O(1/k2) (see Section A.2 of
the supplementary material). This leads to the following result.
Theorem 2. For simplicity, assume bounded domain X = [0, 1] and kernel values f(x, y) ∈
[0, 1] for all x, y ∈ X . Let pi correspond to simple rounding,  > 0, k ≥ 1 and β = k/(k+e−1).
Then Algorithm 1 satisfies -LDP. Furthermore:
• If f is Lf -Lipschitz in each of its arguments, then MSE(Ûf,n) is less than or equal to
1
n(1− β)2 +
(1 + β)2
2n(n− 1)(1− β)4 +
L2f
2k2
.
• If dµ/dλ is Lµ-Lipschitz w.r.t. some measure λ, then MSE(Ûf,n) is less than or equal to
1
n(1− β)2 +
(1 + β)2
2n(n− 1)(1− β)4 +
4L2µ
k2
+
4L4µ
k4
.
Setting k so as to balance the quantization and estimation errors leads to the following
corollary.
Corollary 1. Under the conditions of Theorem 2, for  ≤ 1 and large enough n, taking
k = n1/4
√
L leads to MSE(Ûf,n) = O(L/
√
n), where L corresponds to Lf or Lµ depending
on the assumption.
This result gives concrete error bounds for U -statistics whose kernel is Lipschitz, for
arbitrary data distributions. One important example is the Gini mean difference, whose
corresponding kernel f(xi, xj) = |xi − xj| is 1-Lipschitz. On the other hand, for U -statistics
with non-Lipschitz kernels, the data distribution must be sufficiently smooth (if not, it is
easy to construct cases that make the algorithm fail).
4 Locally Private AUC
In this section, we describe an algorithm for computing AUC (7), whose kernel is discontinuous
and therefore non-Lipschitz. We assume X to be an ordered domain of size d, that is with
each datum in [0..d− 1]. Note that all data is in practice discrete when represented in finite
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Figure 1: Hierarchical histogram h for multiset {0, 1, 2, 2, 3} over the domain {0, 1, 2, 3}.
Level m
Level m + 1
X
X X
Recursed nodes at level m
Active nodes at level m + 1
Discarded nodes at level m
Figure 2: Our algorithm can be seen as a breath-first traversal of a tree, where at each level
some nodes are selected for their subtrees to be explored further.
precision, so this is general. For simplicity of presentation we will assume that (i) d = 2α for
some integer α, and (ii) that the classes of the data, the yi, are public.
Our solution for computing AUC in the local model relies on a hierarchical histogram con-
struction that has been considered in previous works for private collection of high-dimensional
data (Chan et al., 2012), heavy hitters (Bassily et al., 2017), and range queries (Kulka-
rni et al., 2019). A hierarchical histogram is essentially a tree data structure on top of a
histogram where each internal node is labelled with the sum of the values in the interval
covered by it (see Figure 1). That allows to answer any range query about u by checking the
value associated with O(log |u|) nodes in the tree. We first define an exact version of such
hierarchical histograms and explain how to compute AUC from one.
Notation on trees. We represent a binary tree h of depth α with integer node labels as a
total mapping from a prefix-closed set of binary strings of length at most α to the integers.
We refer to the i-th node in level l of the tree by the binary representation of i padded to
length l from the left with zeros. With this notation, hλ is the label of the root node, as we
use λ to denote the empty string, h0 (resp. h1) is the integer label of the left (resp. right)
child of the root of h, and in general hp is the label of the node at path p from the root, i.e.
the label of the node reached by following left or right children from the root according to
the value of p (0 indicates left and 1 indicates right). Let bi be the i-th node in the bottom
level. For two binary strings p, p′ ∈ {0, 1}∗ we denote the prefix relation by p′  p, and their
concatenation as p · p′.
Definition 3. Let S = {s1, . . . , sn} be a multiset, with si ∈ [0..d−1]. A hierarchical histogram
of S is a total mapping h : {0, 1}≤log(d) → Z defined as h(b) = |{s ∈ S | ∃b′ ∈ {0, 1}∗ : b · b′ =
bs}|. For simplicity, we denote h(b) by hb.
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Algorithm. We use hierarchical histograms to compute AUC as follows. Let S+ and S−
be the samples of the positive and negative classes from which we want to estimate AUC.
Let h+ and h− be hierarchical histograms for S+ and S−. Note that h+λ = n
+ and h−λ = n
−.
We can now define the unnormalized AUC, denoted UAUC, over hierarchical histograms
recursively by letting UAUC(h+, h−, p) be 0, if p is a leaf, and otherwise setting:
UAUC(h+, h−, p) = h+p·1h
−
p·0 +
∑
i∈{0,1}
UAUC(h+, h−, p · i) .
Thus we have AUC(S+, S−) = AUC(h+, h−, λ) = 1
n+n−UAUC(h
+, h−, λ).
The above definition naturally leads to an algorithm that proceeds by traversing the
trees h+, h− top-down from the root λ, accumulating the products of counts from h+, h− at
nodes that correspond to entries in h+ that are bigger than entries in h−. We now define
a differentially private analogue. Later we will describe an efficient frequency oracle which
can be used to compute an LDP estimate hˆ of a hierarchical histogram h of n values in a
domain of size 2α. This will provide the following necessary properties (i) hˆ is unbiased,
(ii) Var(hˆ) ≤ v, with v defined as Cnα for some small constant C (iii) the hˆp are pairwise
independent and (iv) Each level of hˆ is independent of the other levels. Our private algorithm
for computing an estimate of UAUC is then defined in terms of parameters n+ and n−, v+
and v− (bounding the variance of hˆ+ and hˆ− respectively), and a > 1 is a small number
depending on n+, n−, α and C.
For a symbol ℵ we write ℵ± to simultaneously refer to ℵ+ and ℵ−. Let h˜±p = max(hˆ±p ,
√
av±/2),
i.e. h˜+p = max(hˆ+p ,
√
av+/2) and h˜−p = max(hˆ−p ,
√
av−/2), and let τ = a
√
v−v+. Our private
estimate is defined as follows. If p is a leaf then ÛAUC(hˆ+, hˆ−, p) is 0, else if h˜+p h˜−p < τ then it
is given by
1
2
∑
i∈{0,1}
hˆ+p·i
∑
i∈{0,1}
hˆ−p·i .
Otherwise, it is given recursively by
hˆ+p·1hˆ
−
p·0 +
∑
i∈{0,1}
ÛAUC(hˆ+, hˆ−, p · i) . (10)
As before, this definition leads to an algorithm. Note that the only difference with its
non-private analogue is that this procedure does not recurse into subtrees whose contribution
to the UAUC is upper bounded sufficiently tightly. More concretely, the server starts by
querying hˆ+, hˆ− at the root, namely with p = λ. If p is a leaf then we return 0 as the AUC.
Otherwise, the algorithm checks whether h˜+p h˜−p < τ . If so, then the algorithm concludes that
there is not much to gain in exploring the subtrees rooted at p · 0 and p · 1, and returns
1
2
∑
i∈0,1
hˆ+p·i
∑
i∈0,1
hˆ−p·i as an estimate of
1
2
h+p h
−
p . This estimate might seem equivalent to
1
2
hˆ+p hˆ
−
p ,
but takes the previous form for a technical reason that is made clear in the proof. In this
case we call p a discarded node. On the other hand, if h˜+p h˜−p ≥ τ , the algorithm proceeds as
its non-private analogue, accumulating the contribution to the UAUC from the direct subtrees
of p and recursing into nodes p · 0 and p · 1. In this case we refer to p as a recursed node.
Thus every node p ∈ {0, 1}≤α will be either recursed, a leaf or there will be a discarded node
p′ such that p′  p. This is depicted in Figure 2.
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Analysis. Note that our algorithm has two sources of error: (i) the one incurred by
discarding nodes and (ii) the error in estimating the contribution to the UAUC of the recursed
nodes. The threshold τ is carefully chosen to balance these two errors.
Let Rm be the set of nodes recursed on at level m. Our accuracy proof starts by bounding
the expected value of |Rm| (see Lemma 4 in Section B.1 of the supplementary) by a quantity
B that is independent of m. We now describe a central argument to our accuracy proof,
stated in the next theorem. Let ERm be the contribution to the error by nodes in Rm. Then,
the total contribution to the error by recursed nodes is ER =
∑
m∈[α] E
R
m. A useful identity is
E(ER2) =
∑
m∈[α] E(ERm
2
), as we can bound E(ERm
2
), for any m, in terms of B (see detailed
proof in the supplementary). Note that this identity follows from E(ERmERm′) = 0, with
m′ > m. The latter would hold if errors ERm and ERm′ were independent, since our frequency
oracle is unbiased. However, errors at a given level are not independent of previous levels.
However E(ERmERm′) = 0 because the conditional expectation of ERm′ with respect to the
answers of the frequency oracles up to level m′ is 0 i.e. ER1 , . . . , ERm′ is a martingale difference
sequence. The idea of conditioning on previous levels is used several times in our proofs, also
to bound the error due to discarded nodes.
Next, we state our accuracy result, which is proven in detail in Section B.1 of the
supplementary. Our proof tracks constants: this is important for practical purposes, and we
show empirically in Section B.3 that our bound is in fact quite tight.
Theorem 3. If α ≤ √n and the following conditions hold:
1. E(hˆ±p − h±p ) = 0 i.e. frequency estimates are unbiased.
2. E((hˆ±p − h±p )2) ≤ v± i.e. MSE of frequency estimator is bounded by v± = Cn±α.
3. For distinct p, p′ ∈ {0, 1}≤α with |p| = |p′|, hˆ±p and hˆ±p′ are independent i.e. the frequency
estimates are pairwise independent.
4. For all m ≤ log(d), the lists (hˆ±p )p∈{0,1}≤m and (hˆ±p )p∈{0,1}>m are independent of each
other.
Then, MSE(ÛAUC) is given by
Cn−n+α2
(
2n+ (4a+ 1) min(n−, n+) +
21
√
2nCα√
a− 1
)
Instantiating hˆ. So far, Theorem 3 does not yield a complete algorithm as it does not
specify an algorithm for computing estimates hˆ of a hierarchical histogram that satisfy the
conditions of Theorem 3. In Section B.2 of the supplementary, we show how to instantiate
such an algorithm in a communication-efficient manner by combining ideas from Bassily et al.
(2017), in particular the use of the Hadamard transform, with an modified version of the
protocol from Kulkarni et al. (2019). This leads to the following result.
Theorem 4. There is a one-round non-interactive protocol for computing AUC in the local
model with MSE bounded by O(α2 log(1/δ)/n2) under (, δ)-LDP and O(α3/n2) under -LDP.
Every user submits one bit, and the server does O(nlog(d)) computation and requires O(log(d))
additional reconstruction space.
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5 Generic Protocols from 2PC
So far, we have proposed a specialized LDP protocol for AUC, and a generic LDP protocol
which requires some assumption on the kernel function or the data distribution to guarantee
nontrivial error bounds. We conjecture that no LDP protocol can guarantee nontrivial error
for arbitrary kernels and distributions, but we leave this as an open question for future work.
In this section, we slightly relax the model of LDP by allowing pairs of users i and j to
compute a randomized version f˜(xi, xj) of their kernel value f(xi, xj) with 2-party secure
computation (2PC). This gives rise to a computational differential privacy (CDP) model
Mironov et al. (2009). Unsurprisingly, we show that in this model we can match the MSE
of O( ln(1/δ)
n2
) for computing regular (univariate) averages in the (, δ)-LDP model by using
advanced composition results (Dwork et al., 2010). However, such a protocol requires O(n2)
communication as all pairs of users need to compute f˜(xi, xj) via 2PC, and does not satisfy
pure -DP.
Proposed protocol. To address these limitations, we propose a protocol in which the
aggregator asks only a (random) subset of pairs of users (i, j) to submit their randomized
kernel value f˜(xi, xj). The idea is to trade-off between the error due to privacy (which
increases as more pairs are used, due to budget splitting) and the subsampling error (for not
averaging over all available pairs). Given a positive integer P (which should be thought of as
a small constant independent of n) and assuming n to be even for simplicity, we propose the
following protocol:
1. Subsampling: The aggregator samples P independent permutations σ1, . . . , σP ∈ Sn
of the set of users {1, . . . , n}. This defines a set of Pn/2 pairs P = (σp(2i −
1, 2i))p∈[P ],1≤i≤N/2.
2. Perturbation: For each pair of users (i, j) ∈ P, users compute f˜(xi, xj) via 2PC and
sends it to the aggregator.
3. Aggregation: The aggregator computes an estimate of Uf as a function of {f˜(xi, xj)}(i,j)∈P .
Analysis. We have the following result for the Laplace mechanism applied to real-
valued kernel functions (the extension to randomized response for discrete-valued kernels is
straightforward). The proof relies on an exact characterization of the subsampling error by
leveraging results on the variance of incomplete U -statistics (Blom, 1976), see Section C.1 of
the supplementary for details.
Theorem 5 (2PC subsampling protocol with Laplace mechanism). Let  > 0, P ≥ 1 and
assume that the kernel f has values in [0, 1]. Consider our subsampling protocol above with
f˜(xi, xj) = f(xi, xj) + ηij where ηij ∼ Lap(P/), and the estimate computed as Ûf,n =
2
Pn
∑
(i,j)∈P f˜(xi, xj). Then the protocol satisfies -CDP, has communication cost of O(Pn)
and
MSE(Ûf,n) =
2
Pn
(
2(P − 1)(1− 1
n− 1
)
ζ1 +
(
1 +
P − 1
n− 1
)
ζ2
)
+
2P
n2
,
where ζ1 and ζ2 are defined as in (3).
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The MSE in Theorem 5 is of O( 1
Pn
+ P
n2
). Remarkably, this shows that the O(1/n)
variance of the estimate that uses all pairs is preserved when subsampling only O(n) pairs.
This is made possible by the strong dependence between the O(n2) terms of the original
U -statistic. As expected, P rules a trade-off between the error due to subsampling and
the error due to privacy: the larger P , the smaller the former but the larger the latter (as
each user must split its budget across P pairs). The optimal value of P depends on the
kernel function and the data distribution (through ζ1 and ζ2) on the one hand, and the
privacy budget  on the other hand. This trade-off, along with the optimality of the proposed
subsampling schemes, are discussed in more details Section C.1 of the supplementary material.
In practice and as illustrated in our experiments, P can be set to a small constant.
Implementing 2PC. Securely computing the randomized kernel value f˜(xi, xj) can be
done efficiently for many kernel functions and local randomizers of interest, as the number of
parties involved is limited to 2. We assume semi-honest parties (see Goldreich, 2004, for a
definition of this threat model). A suitable 2PC technique in this application are garbled
circuits (Yao, 1986; Lindell and Pinkas, 2009; Evans et al., 2018), which are well-suited to
compute Boolean comparisons as required in several of the kernels mentioned in Section 2.1.2.
The circuits for computing the kernels can then be extended with output perturbation
following ideas from Dwork et al. (2006) and Champion et al. (2019). We refer to Section C.2
of the supplement for details on design and complexity.
Remark 2 (Beyond 2PC). One could further relax the model to allow multi-party secure
computation with more than two parties, e.g. by extending the garbled circuit computing
the kernel with secure aggregation over the Pn pairs before performing output perturbation.
This would recover the utility of centralized DP at the cost of much more computation and
quadratic communication, which is not practical, as well as robustness. More interesting
trade-offs may be achieved by securely aggregating small subsets of pairs. We leave the careful
analysis of such extensions to future work.
6 Experiments
AUC protocol. We use the Diabetes dataset (Strack et al., 2014) for the binary classification
task of determining whether a patient will be readmitted in the next 30 days after being
discharged. We train a logistic regression model s which is used to score data points in [0, 1],
and apply our protocol to privately compute AUC on the test set. Patients readmitted before
30 days form the positive class. Class sizes are shown in Figure 3. Class information is not
considered sensitive, as opposed to the score s(x) on private user data s(x), which includes
detailed medical information. Figure 3 shows the standard error achieved by our protocol
for different values of the domain size d. For each value of d we run our protocol with inputs
s(fp(s(xi), d)), where fp denotes a discretization into the domain [0..d− 1]. The plot shows
that d = 29 gives the smallest error, and that increasing  beyond 5 does not improve results
significantly. Recall that the error of our AUC protocol depends on the size of the smallest
class, which is quite small here (only 661 examples).
Protocol from 2PC. We use the Tripadvisor dataset (Wang, 2010). The dataset consists of
user ratings (from scale -1 to 5) for hotels in San Francisco over many service quality metrics
such as room service, location, room cleanliness, front desk service etc. After discarding
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Figure 3: Mean and standard deviation (over 20 runs) of the absolute error of our AUC
protocol on the scores of a logistic regression model trained on a Diabetes dataset.
the records with missing values, we have over 246K records. Let xi = (yi, zi) be ratings
given by user i to the room (yi) and the cleanliness (zi). Our goal is to privately estimate
the Kendall’s tau coefficient (KTC), see (6). The true value of the KTC between the two
variables of interest is 0.8. For this experiment, the 2PC primitive to compute f˜(xi, xj) is
simulated. The main purpose here is to empirically evaluate the privacy-utility trade-off of
our protocol based on subsampling, compared to the protocol that computes all pairs and
relies on advanced composition (we set δ = 1e−8 for the latter). The results shown in Figure 4
show that our subsampling protocol achieves lower error by roughly an order of magnitude,
despite providing a stronger pure LDP guarantee and requiring only linear communication in
n. As predicted by our analysis, P = 1 is best in high privacy regimes (small ) where the
error due to privacy dominates the error due to subsampling. We also see that P > 1 can be
used to reduce the overall error in low privacy regimes.
7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we introduced several protocols for computing U -statistics from private user
data. Our methods cover many statistical quantities of broad interest which were not
addressed by previous private protocols. While we focused on pairwise U -statistics for ease
of exposition, our ideas can be extended to U -statistics of higher degrees such as the Volume
Under the ROC Surface (VUS), the generalization of AUC to multipartite ranking (Clémençon
et al., 2013).
Our protocol in Section 3 is not tight in many situations. In the case of sum, and possibly
in the case of the Gini coefficient, it would be more accurate if randomized rounding were
used instead of simple rounding. We leave this investigation for later work.
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Figure 4: Mean and standard deviation (over 20 runs) of the absolute error in KTC on
Tripadvisor dataset.
A promising direction for future work is to develop private multi-party algorithms for
learning with pairwise losses (Kar et al., 2013; Clémençon et al., 2016) by combining private
stochastic gradient descent for standard empirical risk minimization (Bassily et al., 2014;
Shokri and Shmatikov, 2015) and our protocols to compute the gradient estimates.
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A Details and Proofs for Generic LDP Protocol
We start by introducing some notations. We denote by k the number of bins of the quantization
and by pi : X → [k] the quantization scheme such that for any data point x ∈ X , pi(x) denotes
the quantized version of x (i.e., its image under pi). Let ei denote the vector of length k with
a one in the i-th position and 0 elsewhere. A kernel function fA on the quantized domain
[k] is fully described by a matrix A ∈ Rk×k such that fA(i, j) = Ai,j = eTi Aej. We denote by
UA,pi = Eµ×µ[Api(x),pi(y))] the quantized analogue to the quantity Uf .
The proposed protocol, described in Algorithm 1, applies generalized randomized response
on data quantized with pi and uses this to compute an unbiased estimate of a quantized
U -statistic. The choice of the quantized kernel A will be discussed below. Crucially, there are
two sources of error in this protocol. More precisely, the mean squared error of the estimate
Ûf,n returned by Algorithm 1 can be bounded as follows:
MSE(Ûf,n) ≤ (Uf − UA,pi)2 + E[(UA,pi − Ûf,n)2]. (11)
The first term corresponds to the error due to quantization, while the second one is the
estimation error due to randomization needed to satisfy local differential privacy. The latter
will increase with k, thereby constraining k to remain reasonably small. We will thus need to
rely on assumptions on either the kernel or the data distribution to be able to control the
error due to quantization.
In line with the error decomposition in (11), we conduct our analysis by considering the
effect of sampling and randomization together. Therefore, we will not provide a direct bound
on the error between our estimate and the U-statistic of the sample, but directly with respect
to the population quantity Uf . We now show how to control the two sources of error, which
are easily combined to yield Theorem 2.
A.1 Bounding the Error of Randomized Response on Discrete Do-
main
In this part, we bound the second term in (11): we consider that the data is discrete (X = [k])
and derive error bounds for the estimate Ûf,n with respect to UA,pi for a given kernel function
f˜(i, j) = Ai,j. We propose to use the generalized randomized response mechanism as our
local randomizer R. We introduce some notations. Let β be the probability of R selecting
a response uniformly at random, i.e. let P(R(x) = y) = β/k + (1 − β)χx=y, let b be the
vector of length k with every entry β/k. For convenience, we denote the data sample by
x1, . . . , xn ∈ [k]. Note that these data points are drawn i.i.d. from a distribution D over [k]
(which follows from µ and pi) such that P(xi = j) = Dj.
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With these notations, we write the expected value of the discretized kernel computed
directly on the randomized data points:
E[(eR(x1))TAeR(x2)] = E(((1− β)ex1 + b)TA((1− β)ex2 + b))
= E((1− β)2eTx1Aex2 + (1− β)(ex1 + ex2)TAb+ bTAb).
This is a biased estimator of fA(x1, x2) = ex1Aex2 due to the effect of the randomization. We
correct for this by adding terms and scaling, leading to the estimator used in Algorithm 1:
f̂A(R(x1),R(x2)) = (1− β)−2(eR(x1) − b)TA(eR(x2) − b).
This is an unbiased estimator of the population U-statistic, as for fixed x1 and x2 it is an
unbiased estimator of fA(x1, x2). Averaging over all pairs of randomized inputs, we get the
proposed estimator:
Ûf,n =
(
n
2
)−1 ∑
1≤i<j≤n
f̂A(R(xi),R(xj)),
which is itself a U-statistic on the randomized sample. As this estimator is unbiased, its
mean squared error is equal to its variance, for which the following lemma gives an exact
expression.
Lemma 1. The variance of Ûf,n is given by(
n
2
)−1(
2n− 3
(1− β)2 Var(e(R(x1))
TAD) +
1
(1− β)4E(Var((eR(x1) − b)AeR(x2) | R(x1)))
)
Proof. Ûf,n is a U -statistic, hence its variance is given by (3) where ζ1 = Var(E(f̂A(R(x1),R(x2)) |
R(x1))) and ζ2 = Var(f̂A(R(x1),R(x2))). We first simplify ζ1:
ζ1 = (1− β)−4Var(E((eR(x1) − b)TA(eR(x2) − b) | R(x1)))
= (1− β)−4Var((eR(x1) − b)TA((1− β)D))
= (1− β)−2Var((eR(x1) − b)TAD)
= (1− β)−2Var((eR(x1))TAD).
Similarly for ζ2, we have:
ζ2 = Var(E(f̂(R(x1),R(x2)) | R(x1))) + E(Var(f̂(R(x1),R(x2)) | R(x1)))
= ζ1 + (1− β)−4E(Var((eR(x1) − b)TA(eR(x2) − b) | R(x1)))
= ζ1 + (1− β)−4E(Var((eR(x1) − b)TAeR(x2) | R(x1))).
Substituting the values of ζ1 and ζ2 in the variance expression gives the result. 
Assuming a uniform bound on the values of f allows a clear and simple bound on the
variance.
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Corollary 2. If f(x, x′) ∈ [0, 1] for all x, x′, then
Var(Ûf,n) ≤ 1
n(1− β)2 +
(1 + β)2
2n(n− 1)(1− β)4 .
Proof. Under the boundedness of f , the random variable (eR(x1))TAD takes values in [0, 1]
and so has variance at most 1/4, whilst the random variable (eR(x1)−B)TAeR(x2) takes values
in [−β, 1] and so has variance at most (1 + β)2/4. Substituting these into Lemma 1 gives the
result. 
To achieve local differential privacy with parameter , β should be taken to be k/(k+e−1).
This leads directly to the following result.
Corollary 3 (Variance under randomized reponse). Let X = [k] and assume f takes values
in [0, 1]. We have:
Var(Ûf,n) ≈ (1 + k/)
2
n
+
(1 + k/)4
2n2
≈ k
2
n2
,
where the approximation holds for small  and n k2/2.
The above result shows that for fixed  the error incurred by this estimator is within
a constant factor of the error due to the finite sample setting. As expected, k should be
reasonably small for the protocol to yield any utility.
A.2 Bounding the Error of Quantization
We now study the effect of quantization, which is needed to control the error due to privacy
when the domain is continuous or has large cardinality. Recall that we quantize X using a
projection pi : X → [k] (assumed to be simple rounding for simplicity), and our goal is to
approximate Uf = Eµ×µ(f(x, y)) by UA,pi = Eµ×µ(Api(x),pi(y)), which we can privately estimate
using the results of Section A.1.
The error incurred by the quantization can be written as follows:
(Uf − UA,pi)2 ≤
∫ ∫
(f(x, y)− Api(x),pi(y))2dµ(y)dµ(x)
=
k∑
i,j=1
∫
pi−1(i)
∫
pi−1(j)
(f(x, y)− Ai,j)2dµ(y)dµ(x). (12)
To bound this quantization error, we need additional assumptions. We consider two
options, each suggesting a different choice for the quantized kernel Ai,j. We first consider a
Lipschitz assumption on the original kernel function, for which the preferred quantized kernel
minimizes the worst-case bound on (12). Then, we consider a smoothness assumption on the
data distribution, leading to a quantized kernel that attempts to minimize the average-case
error. We stress the fact that in some cases these quantized statistics will match or at least
be very close, meaning that the particular choice of quantized kernel will not be crucial.
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A.2.1 Assumption of Lipschitz Kernel Function
Our first assumption is motived by the fact that for all data distributions µ, the quantization
error (12) can be bounded by
k∑
i,j=1
µ(pi−1(i))µ(pi−1(j)) max
x∈pi−1(i)
y∈pi−1(j)
(f(x, y)− Ai,j)2. (13)
This bound is minimized by choosing the quantized kernel to be
AMidi,j =
1
2
max
x∈pi−1(i)
y∈pi−1(j)
f(x, y) +
1
2
min
x∈pi−1(i)
y∈pi−1(j)
f(x, y), (14)
which we will call the midpoint kernel. With this kernel we can define
∆i,j =
1
4
(
max
x∈pi−1(i),y∈pi−1(j)
f(x, y)− min
x∈pi−1(i),y∈pi−1(j)
f(x, y)
)2
,
which allows us to write the bound in equation 13 as
∆ =
k∑
i,j=1
µ(pi−1(i))µ(pi−1(j))∆i,j.
Note that this is itself a discrete U -statistic over the population. The error can now be
bounded through a bound on ∆. A natural way to achieve this is to uniformly bound ∆i,j,
which can be done by assuming that the kernel function f is Lipschitz. This allows to control
the error within each bin.
Lemma 2 (Quantization error for Lipschitz kernel functions). Let X = [0, 1] and assume
f : X × X → R is Lf -Lipschitz in each input. Let the set of bins be {(2l − 1)/2k : l ∈ [k]}
and let the quantization scheme pi perform simple rounding of inputs (affecting them to the
nearest bin). Then we have (Uf − UA,pi)2 ≤ L2f/2k2.
Proof. By the Lipschitz property of f , we have that |f(x, y)−f(x′, y′)| ≤ Lf (|x−x′|+ |y−y′|)
for all x, x′, y, y′. Since the diameter of each bin is equal to 1/k, we have ∆i,j ≤ L2f/2k2 for
all i, j ∈ [k] and the lemma follows. 
As desired, the quantization error decreases with k. Note that the Lipschitz assumption
is met in the important case of the Gini mean difference, while it does not hold for AUC
and Kendall’s tau. Bounding ∆ is not the right approach for such kernels: indeed, for AUC,
∆i,i = 1/2 and so for data distributions µ with µ(pi−1(i)) = 1 for some i, the quantization
error ∆ ≥ 1/2. In the next section, we consider generic kernel functions under a smoothness
assumption on the data distributions.
Remark 3 (Empirical Estimation of ∆). The quantization error ∆ is a discrete U -statistic
which can be estimated from the data collected to estimate U . This provides a good empirical
estimate of ∆ after the fact. However, as the data has to be collected before the estimate can be
made it provides no guidance in choosing pi (this might be addressed by a multi-round protocol,
which we leave for future work). The empirical assessment of ∆ may provide a tighter bound
on the actual error than can be ascertained by the worst-case Lipschitz assumption.
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A.2.2 Assumption of Smooth Data Distribution
We now consider a smoothness assumption on the data distribution µ. Specifically, we assume
that the density dµ/dλ with respect to a measure λ (which varies little on pi−1(i) for all i) is
C-Lipschitz.
In this case, a more sensible choice of quantized kernel is given by
AAvgi,j =
1
λ(pi−1(i))λ(pi−1(j))
∫
pi−1(i)
∫
pi−1(j)
f(x, y)dλ(y)dλ(x), (15)
which we call the average kernel as the value of AAvgi,j corresponds to the (normalized)
expectation of f(x, y), with respect to λ, over points x and y that are mapped to bin i and j
respectively.
Under our smoothness assumption, the quantization error (12) can be bounded as follows.
Lemma 3 (Quantization error for smooth distributions). Let X = [0, 1] and f(x, y) ∈ [0, 1] for
all x, y.2 Assume that dµ/dλ is Lµ-Lipschitz. Then we have (Uf−UA,pi)2 ≤ 4L2µD2(1+L2µD2),
where D is the maximum diameter of the quantization bins.
Proof. For notational convenience, let us denote µ¯i := µ(pi−1(i)) and λ¯i := λ(pi−1(i)) for each
i. The absolute quantization error with quantized kernel (15) is given by:∣∣∣∣∣
k∑
i,j=1
∫
pi−1(i)
∫
pi−1(j)
f(x, y)− AAvgi,j dµ(y)dµ(x)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
k∑
i,j=1
∣∣∣∣∫
pi−1(i)
∫
pi−1(j)
f(x, y)− AAvgi,j dµ(y)dµ(x)
∣∣∣∣
=
k∑
i,j=1
∣∣∣∣∫
pi−1(i)
∫
pi−1(j)
f(x, y)dµ(y)dµ(x)− µ¯iµ¯jAAvgi,j
∣∣∣∣ (16)
Note that∫
pi−1(i)
∫
pi−1(j)
f(x, y)dµ(y)dµ(x) =
∫
pi−1(i)
∫
pi−1(j)
f(x, y)
dµ(y)
dλ(y)
dµ(x)
dλ(x)
dλ(y)dλ(x),
and
µ¯iµ¯jA
Avg
i,j =
µ¯iµ¯j
λ¯iλ¯j
∫
pi−1(i)
∫
pi−1(j)
f(x, y)dλ(y)dλ(x).
2Similar arguments can be made in more general metric spaces.
21
Plugging these equations into (16) we get:∣∣∣∣∫
pi−1(i)
∫
pi−1(j)
f(x, y)dµ(y)dµ(x)− µ¯iµ¯jAAvgi,j
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∫
pi−1(i)
∫
pi−1(j)
f(x, y)
(dµ(y)
dλ(y)
dµ(x)
dλ(x)
− µ¯iµ¯j
λ¯iλ¯j
)
dλ(y)dλ(x)
∣∣∣∣
≤
∫
pi−1(i)
∫
pi−1(j)
∣∣∣∣dµ(y)dλ(y) dµ(x)dλ(x) − µ¯iµ¯jλ¯iλ¯j
∣∣∣∣ dλ(y)dλ(x) (17)
≤
∫
pi−1(i)
∫
pi−1(j)
LµD
(
max
z∈pi−1(i)
dµ(z)/dλ(z) + max
w∈pi−1(j)
dµ(w)dλ(w)
)
dλ(y)dλ(x) (18)
≤
∫
pi−1(i)
∫
pi−1(j)
(LµD)dλ(y)dµ(x) +
∫
pi−1(i)
∫
pi−1(j)
(LµD)dµ(y)dλ(x)
+
∫
pi−1(i)
∫
pi−1(j)
(LµD)(2LµD)dλ(y)dλ(x). (19)
Summing over all i, j and taking the square finally gives the result:(∫ ∫
f(x, y)dµ(y)dµ(x)−
∑
µ(pi−1(i))µ(pi−1(j))AAvgi,j
)2
≤4L2µD2 + 4L4µD4.

The diameter of quantization bins is typically of order 1/k, hence the quantization error is
of order 1/k2. In practice, λ can simply be taken to be Lebesgue measure, hence computing
(15) amounts to averaging the kernel function over all possible points (x, y) ∈ X that fall in
the bins (i, j), and can be easily approximated by Monte Carlo sampling when one does not
have a closed form expression for the integral.
B Details and Proofs for AUC Protocol
B.1 Proof of Theorem 3
We define Rm = {p ∈ {0, 1}m : ∀p′  p, h˜−p′h˜+p′ > τ} as the set of nodes recursed on at level
m. Similarly, and for m > 0, let Am = Rm−1 · {0, 1} be the active nodes at level m, i.e. those
to be either recursed on or discarded. Then, the set of discarded nodes at level m is defined
as Dm = Am \ Rm. Our algorithm has two main sources of error: (i) the one incurred on
by discarded nodes, i.e. nodes in
⋃
i∈[α]
Dm for whose intervals the algorithm uses a rough
estimate, and (ii) the error in the estimating the contribution to the UAUC of the recursed
nodes, i.e. nodes in
⋃
i∈[α]
Rm.
The threshold τ is carefully chosen according to the error of the estimator hˆ to balance
these two errors. In this way we translate error bounds for hˆ+p , hˆ−p into error bounds for ÛAUC.
Our proof starts by bounding the expected size of Rm.
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Lemma 4. Consider the instantiation of Equation 10 with a frequency oracle for estimating
h± satisfying ∀p ∈ {0, 1}≤α : (E(hˆ±p ) = h±p ,E((hˆ±p − h±p )2) ≤ v±), with v± = Cn±α, i.e. the
estimate is unbiased and has uniformly bounded MSE. If a > 1, then for all m ∈ [α],
E(|Rm|) ≤
√
n+ +
√
n−
2(
√
a− 1)√Cα ≤
1√
a− 1
√
n
2Cα
Proof. Let nˆ± =
∑
p∈Am max(hˆ
±
p , 0), the sum of the positive estimated counts of active nodes
at level m.
Note that if p ∈ Rm then h˜+p h˜−p ≥ a
√
v+v−. In this case either, hˆ±p = h˜±p and thus
hˆ+p hˆ
−
p ≥ a
√
v+v−, hˆ−p 6= h˜−p and thus hˆ+p > 2
√
av+, or hˆ−p 6= h˜−p and thus hˆ−p > 2
√
av−. In
any of these cases hˆ+p /
√
av+ + hˆ−p /
√
av− ≥ 2.
Therefore
2|Rm| ≤
∑
p∈Rm
hˆ+p√
av+
+
hˆ−p√
av−
≤ nˆ
+
√
av+
+
nˆ−√
av−
and thus
E(|Rm|) ≤ E(nˆ
+)
2
√
av+
+
E(nˆ−)
2
√
av−
.
We bound E(nˆ±) as follows
E(nˆ±) =
∑
p∈Am
E(max(hˆ±p , 0)) ≤ n± +
∑
p∈Am
E(max(e±p , 0))
≤n± + E(|Am|) max
p∈Am
E(max(e±p , 0)) ≤ n± + E(|Rm−1|) max
p∈Am
E(|e±p |)
≤n± + E(|Rm−1|) max
p∈Am
√
E(|e±p |2) ≤ n± + E(|Rm−1|)
√
v±
We can now use this to bound the expression for E(|Rm|).
E(|Rm|) ≤ n
+
2
√
av+
+
n−
2
√
av−
+
E(|Rm−1|)√
a
(20)
We now need a bound on E(|Rm−1|) so we will proceed by induction.
Let B =
√
n++
√
n−
2(
√
a−1)√Cα . We take E(|Rm−1|) ≤ B as the induction hypothesis, and E(|R0|) =
1 ≤ B as the base case.
The expression on the right hand side of inequality 20 is a monotonically increasing
function of E(|Rm−1|) and has a fixed point
n+
2
√
av+
+ n
−
2
√
av−
1− 1√
a
=
n+
2
√
v+
+ n
−
2
√
v−√
a− 1 =
√
n+
Cα
+
√
n−
Cα
2(
√
a− 1) =
√
n+ +
√
n−
2(
√
a− 1)√Cα = B.
Thus we can conclude that
E(|Rm|) ≤ B (21)
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completing the induction and thus (21) holds for all m.
Finally we note that √
n+ +
√
n− ≤
√
2n
and so √
n+ +
√
n−
2(
√
a− 1)√Cα ≤
1√
a− 1
√
n
2Cα
completing the proof. 
We are now ready to prove Theorem 3.
Proof of Theorem 3. The estimation error Ep = ÛAUC(hˆ+p , hˆ−p )−UAUC(h+p , h−p ) at a given node
p can be written recursively as follows:
Ep =

1
2
(hˆ+p·1 + hˆ
+
p·0)(hˆ
−
p·1 + hˆ
−
p·0)− UAUC(h+p , h−p ) if p ∈ D
0 if p is a leaf
hˆ+p·1hˆ
−
p·0 − h+p·1h−p·0 + Ep·0 + Ep·1 if p ∈ R
We will consider the error Eλ in two parts. Firstly, there is the contribution ED from
those prefixes p ∈ D which we define by setting
EDm =
∑
p∈Dm−1
1
2
(hˆ+p·1 + hˆ
+
p·0)(hˆ
−
p·1 + hˆ
−
p·0)− UAUC(h+p , h−p )
and ED =
∑
m∈[α] E
D
m. Secondly, there is the contribution from the prefixes p ∈ R excluding
their recursive subcalls which we define by setting
ERm =
∑
p∈Rm−1
hˆ+p·1hˆ
−
p·0 − h+p·1h−p·0
and ER =
∑
m∈[α] E
R
m. In bounding both of these we will make use of conditioning on
Fm = (hˆ−p , hˆ+p )p∈{0,1}≤m i.e. the answers of the frequency oracles for layers up to m.
We start by bounding ER. For any m ∈ [α], we first show that ERm is a martingale
difference sequence i.e.
E(ERm|Fm−1) = E(
∑
p∈Rm−1
(hˆ+p·1hˆ
−
p·0 − h+p·1h−p·0)|Fm−1)
=
∑
p∈Rm−1
E((h+p·1 + e+p·1)(h−p·0 + e−p·0)− h+p·1h−p·0)
=
∑
p∈Rm−1
E(h+p·1e−p·0 + e+p·0h−p·0 + e+p·1e−p·0)
= 0
where the final equality holds because E(e±p ) = 0 for all p and e+p·1 and e−p·0 are independent.
From this we can conclude that for m′ > m
E(ERmERm′) = E(E(ERmERm′ |Fm′−1))) = E(ERmE(ERm′ |Fm′−1)) = E(0) = 0
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and thus
E(ER2) = E(
∑
m∈[α]
∑
m′∈[α]
ERmE
R
m′) =
∑
m∈[α]
E(ERm
2
) =
∑
m∈[α]
E(E(ERm
2|Fm−1)). (22)
Next we shall bound E(ERm
2|Fm−1). We start by writing out
E(ERm
2|Fm−1) = E((
∑
p∈Rm−1
(hˆ+p·1hˆ
−
p·0 − h+p·1h−p·0))2|Fm−1).
By Equation 22 this becomes
E(ERm
2|Fm−1) =
∑
p∈Rm−1
E((hˆ+p·1hˆ−p·0 − h+p·1h−p·0)2|Fm−1).
After expanding the above and removing all the terms that are zero, because they are the
expected value of the product of e±p·i with something independent of it, we are left with
E(ERm
2|Fm−1) =
∑
p∈Rm−1
E(h+p·1
2
e−p·0
2
+ e+p·0
2
h−p·0
2
+ e+p·1
2
e−p·0
2
)
≤
∑
p∈Rm−1
(v−h+p·1
2
+ v+h−p·0
2
) + |Rm|v+v−
≤ v−n+2 + v+n−2 + |Rm|v+v−.
Subbing this into (22) and using Lemma 4 gives
E(ER2) ≤ αmax
m
E(v−n+2 + v+n−2 + |Rm|v+v−)
= α(v−n+2 + v+n−2 + max
m
E(|Rm|)v+v−)
≤ n+n−Cα2(n+ + n− + Cα√
a− 1
√
n
2Cα
)
≤ n+n−Cα2(n+
√
Cαn√
2(
√
a− 1))
=: BR
To bound ED, first define EFm =
∑
p∈Dm−1
1
2
(hˆ+p·1 + hˆ
+
p·0)(hˆ
−
p·1 + hˆ
−
p·0)− 12h+p h−p and EGm =∑
p∈Dm
1
2
h+p h
−
p − UAUC(h+p , h−p ). We refer to the leaves in [0..2α − 1] covered by a path p as
I(p) = {i ∈ [0..d− 1] : p  bi}. Now note that
ED =
∑
p∈D
1
2
(hˆ+p·1 + hˆ
+
p·0)(hˆ
−
p·1 + hˆ
−
p·0)−
∑
i∈I(p)
h+bi
∑
j∈I(p),j<i
h−bj =
∑
m∈[α]
EFm +
∑
m∈[α]
EGm.
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We now bound EFm and EGm separately. For a leaf node s, let us denote by v(s) the unique
node in D that is a prefix of s. We then have:
E((
∑
m∈[α]
EGm)
2) = E((
∑
p∈D
1
2
h+p h
−
p − UAUC(h+p , h−p ))2)
≤ E((
∑
p∈D
1
2
h+p h
−
p )
2) =
1
4
E((
∑
p∈D
∑
i∈I(p)
h+bi
∑
j∈I(p),j<i
h−bj)
2)
≤ n
+2
4
max
s∈[0..d−1]
E((h−v(s))
2).
We can then bound
E(h−v(s)
2
) =
∑
pp(s)
E(h−p
2Ip=v(s)) =
∑
pp(s)
E((hˆ−p − e−p )2Ip=v(s))
≤
∑
ps
E((2
√
av− − e−p )2Ip=v(s)) ≤
∑
ps
E(4av− − 4
√
av−e−p + e
−
p
2
)
≤(4a+ 1)αv−.
Thus
E(EG2) ≤n+2(a+ 1/4)αv− ≤ C(a+ 1/4)n−n+2α2.
Furthermore by symmetry between − and +
E(EG2) ≤ C(a+ 1/4)n−n+ min(n−, n+)α2 =: BG.
Secondly we bound
∑
m∈[α] E
F
m. Note that EFm−1 is a function of Fm−1 and E(EFm|Fm−1) = 0
so
E((
∑
m
EFm)
2) = E(
∑
m
EFm
2
) =
∑
m
E(EFm
2
) =
∑
m
E(E(EFm
2|Fm−1))
≤
∑
m
E(E((
∑
p∈Dm−1
1
2
(hˆ+p·1 + hˆ
+
p·0)(hˆ
−
p·1 + hˆ
−
p·0)−
1
2
h+p h
−
p )
2|Fm−1))
Similarly to the bound on ER, we now apply the pairwise independence property and note
that hˆ±p·1 + hˆ
±
p·0 is an unbiased estimator of h±p with variance bounded by 2v±. This results in
E((
∑
m
EFm)
2) ≤
∑
m
E(
∑
p∈Am−1
Ih˜+p h˜−p <τE(h
+
p
2
v−/2 + v+h−p
2
/2 + v+v−|Fm−1))
≤
∑
m
v−E(
∑
p∈Am−1
Ih˜+p h˜−p <τh
+
p
2
)/2 + v+E(
∑
p∈Am−1
Ih˜+p h˜−p <τh
−
p
2
)/2 + v+v−E(|Am−1|).
Noting that E(Ih˜+p h˜−p <τh
+
p
2
) ≤ min(h+p 2, h
+
p
2
v+
(h+p −
√
v+)2
) ≤ 4v+ and that E(|Am−1|) = 2E(|Rm−2|) ≤
1√
a−1
√
n
2Cα
gives
E((
∑
m
EFm)
2) ≤
∑
m
E(|Am−1|)5v+v− ≤ 5
√
2nC1.5α2.5n+n−√
a− 1 := B
F .
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By the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality we can conclude that,
E(ED2) ≤ 2(BG +BF ).
Finally applying Cauchy-Schwarz again gives
E(E2λ) = E((ER + EG + EF )2)
≤ 2BR + 4BG + 4BF
= Cn−n+α2(2n+ (4a+ 1) min(n−, n+) +
21
√
2nCα√
a− 1 )

Remark 4. The use of Cauchy-Schwarz to combine the separate errors in this proof is
optimized for simplicity rather than minimizing the constants. At the expense of making the
bound substantially more complicated a more precise analysis would reduce the bound. Gaining
up to a factor of two in the case of very large n and min(n−, n+) small compared to n.
The value of a in Theorem 3 can be chosen to minimize the error by taking it to solve√
a(
√
a− 1)2 = 21√2ncα/(8 min(n−, n+)) which is approximately
a = (1 +
√
21/8(2Cnα/min(n−, n+)2)
1
4 )2.
This leads to the following corollary.
Corollary 4. Let nmin = min(n−, n+) and a = (1 +
√
21/8(2Cnα/n2min)
1
4 )2 = 1 + o(1) then
MSE(ÂUC) ≤ C
nmin(n− nmin)α
2(2n+ (4a+ 1)nmin + 14(Cnn
2
minα)
1
4 ) = O(α2/nmin).
Remark 5. For fixed α this is of the same order as the sampling error incurred in non-private
AUC.
Algorithm variant. An alternative algorithm assigns a value of zero to edges that it
discards. For this algorithm a similar theorem holds by the same argument (actually a slightly
simpler argument) the resulting error bound is
MSE(ÛAUC) = Cn−n+α2(2n+ (8a+ 2) min(n−, n+) +
√
2Cαn
(
√
a− 1)).
Note that the second term which is of leading order for min(n−, n+) a fixed fraction of n
is twice as large however the final term which is lower order is twenty-one times smaller.
This lower order term might not be negligible in practice and so this algorithm should be
considered. The corresponding choice of a and bound on the final error is given by the
following result.
Corollary 5. Let nmin = min(n−, n+) and a = (1 +
√√
2Cαn
16nmin
)2 = 1 + o(1) then
MSE(ÂUC) ≤ C
nmin(n− nmin)α
2((8a+ 2)nmin + 2n+ (512Cαnn
2
min)
1
4 ) = O(α2/nmin)
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Algorithm 2: Local Randomizer
Public Parameters: Domain size 2l, privacy budget .
Input: Private index q
Output: A single bit z submitted to the server
1 j ← [0..2l − 1] . Selected uniformly at random
2 y := 1√
2l
(−1)〈j,q〉 . y is Mj,xl, where M ∈ {−1, 1}2l×2l is a Hadamard matrix
3 z :=
{
y with probability e
1+e
¬y otherwise . Submit randomized response on y
4 Send j, z to the Aggregator
B.2 Instantiating the Private Hierarchical Histogram hˆ
Theorem 3 does not yield a complete algorithm as it only states that, if we had a differ-
entially private algorithm for computing estimates of a hierarchical histogram that satisfy
the conditions of Theorem 3, then we could solve AUC with the stated accuracy. In this
section we instantiate such algorithm and show that, besides the required error guarantees,
our proposal also has other nice properties, namely (i) it is one round, (ii) each user sends a
single bit, and (iii) it is sublinear in d processing space at the server.
B.2.1 Frequency Oracle
Relevant previous work on estimating hierarchical histograms in the local model includes
the work of Bassily et al. (2017). While in that work the target problem is heavy hitters,
their algorithm is similar to ours, as the server retrieves the heavy hitters by exploring a
hierarchical histogram. Moreover their protocol – called TreeHist – has the nice properties
listed above, as it is one round, every user sends a single bit and requires reconstruction space
sublinear in d. This satisfies the three above conditions. It is thus tempting to reuse the
hierarchical histogram construction from Bassily et al. (2017). However, it does not satisfy
the conditions of Theorem 3, as it is not guaranteed to be unbiased.
Alternative recent algorithms for constructing hierarchical histograms in the local model
are presented in Kulkarni et al. (2019), with the motivation of answering range queries
over a large domain. This proposal is much closer to what we need. However, it has
some shortcomings: first, although it is one round, each user sends O(log(d)) bits, and
more importantly, it requires space O(d) space at the server, as it reconstructs the whole
hierarchical histogram. However, one can tweak the protocol from Kulkarni et al. (2019) to
overcome these limitations. We shall first split the users into log(d) groups (one for each level)
and then for each level we shall apply the frequency oracle. Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 3
show the local randomizer (user side) and frequency oracle (server side) for each histogram.
Let count(q) be the true count of an index q in a histogram. The following lemma is
shown in Kulkarni et al. (2019).
Lemma 5. The frequency oracle, Algorithm 3, run with nl users is unbiased E(zq) = count(q)
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Algorithm 3: Frequency Oracle
Public Parameters: Domain size 2l, privacy budget .
Input: The index ji and response zi of each party i and an index q to estimate the
frequency of
Output: z an estimated count of q
1 For all i, yi := 1√2l (−1)〈ji,q〉 . yi is Mji,q, where M ∈ {−1, 1}2
l×2l is a
Hadamard matrix
2 zq :=
e+1
e−1
∑
i
yizi . De-bias the sum of contributions
3 Return zq
and satisfies the following bound on the MSE.
E((zq − count(q))2) ≤ 4nle

(e − 1)2 (23)
Additionally we require the following lemma on the frequency oracle satisfies condition
(3) in Theorem 3 which is given by the following lemma.
Lemma 6. For distinct q, q′ ∈ [0..2l − 1], zq and zq′ are independent i.e. the responses of the
oracle are pairwise independent.
Proof. As each user is independent of every other user it suffices to show that each user’s
contribution to the two entries are independent. Suppose that a user has input q′′ 6= q′,
chooses index j to report and let b be a bit indicating that the user chose z = ¬y in Algorithm
2. That user’s contributions to the two estimates (scaled by 2l) are (−1)〈j,q〉+〈j,q′′〉+b and
(−1)〈j,q′〉+〈j,q′′〉+b. Note that we can consider j, q, q′ and q′′ as elements of Fl2. Then q + q′′
and q′ + q′′ are distinct and q′ + q′′ 6= 0. These two facts imply respectively that 〈j, q′ + q′′〉
is independent of 〈j, q + q′′〉 and that 〈j, q′ + q′′〉 is uniformly distributed in F2. Thus the
contributions are independent. 
B.2.2 Splitting Strategies
We will instantiate hˆ by running the frequency oracle above for each level of the hierarchy.
The main choice remaining is how to determine which users contribute to each layer, we will
consider two possibilities here. Firstly we can have everyone contribute to all layers, splitting
their privacy budget. Alternatively, users can be split evenly across levels at random, each
contributing to only one frequency oracle. Another possibility is to assign each user to a level
independently and uniformly, this is similar to splitting them evenly though adds slightly
more noise and is more complicated to analyse. In all cases, conditions 1 and 3 in Theorem 3
follow from Lemmas 5 and 6.
Splitting Privacy Budget Across Layers. In the case of everyone contributing to all
layers the privacy budget can be split using either basic or advanced composition. In either
case condition 4 from Theorem 3 holds as the randomness for each layer is independent.
29
For pure differential privacy we must use basic composition. This allows us to run each
frequency oracle can be run with a privacy budget of ˜ = /α. Lemma 5 then gives a bound
of O(nα2) on the mean squared error of each entry. While this is insufficient to establish
condition 2 of Theorem 3, similar arguments can be used to prove that the algorithm built in
this way achieves pure differential privacy at the cost of an α factor in the MSE.
If we instead settle for (, δ)-differential privacy, and assume for convenience that  ≤√
α ln(2), advanced composition allows each frequency oracle to be run with privacy budget
˜ = /(
√
α(1 +
√
2 log(1/δ))). Condition 2 in Theorem 3 then holds for some C depending
on  and δ. This is the implementation and analysis that gives Theorem 3 as it is stated.
Splitting Users Across Layers. When splitting users across levels the frequency oracles
can each be run with privacy budget . However, each oracle will have only n/α users and
there is a subsampling error between the total sample and the input given to the frequency
oracle. The squared error due to subsampling is O(1/n) thus Lemma 5 provides a O(nα)
bound on the MSE. This means that condition 2 of Theorem 3 holds. This would provide a
version of Theorem 3 with pure differential privacy, however condition 4 from Theorem 3 fails
to hold. Intuitively this is because if a user contributes to one level they can’t contribute
to another level. There are still two things that can be proved about this version of the
algorithm.
Firstly, it is still possible to prove a result like Theorem 3, but in which the MSE is α times
bigger. The proof of this result follows the same steps as that of Theorem 3 except that
the martingale difference sequences argument must be replaced by a bound not assuming
pairwise independence.
A second way of viewing this algorithm is to think of each input as being drawn inde-
pendently from some population distribution and then compare the output to the AUC
of that distribution. That is, given a pair of distributions D±, S± is obtained by sam-
pling each value independently from D±. Denote AUCpop = Ex+∼D+,x−∼D− [f(x+, x−)] and
let MSEpop(ÂUC) = E[(AUCpop − ÂUC)2]. The fact that each of the users has an independent
identically distributed input means that the contribution to each layer is independent, i.e.
we can recover Theorem 3 with MSE replaced by MSEpop. This alternative notion of MSEpop is
the correct notion to work with if the purpose of the deployment of the algorithm is to find
the AUC of the population the sample is drawn from rather than just of the sample. This is
likely to be the case in many applications.
Summary. Table 1 summarizes the choices in the algorithm and analysis. The resulting
orders of the MSE, corresponding to Theorem 4 are given in the final column.
B.3 Additional AUC experiments
Figure 5 shows the error that our algorithm incurs on two synthetic datasets. The first data
set “bench=auc_one” consists of two distinct inputs (d− 1, 1) and (0,−1) each occurring 106
times. On this data set the algorithm incurs considerable error due to significant recursion
error, ERm, being incurred for every level. This example illustrates that our analysis is not far
from being tight.
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Splitting Analysis Error in ÂUC
Privacy budget Basic composition MSE ≤ O( α3
n2
)
Privacy budget Advanced composition MSE ≤ O(α2 log(1/δ)
n2
)
Users w.r.t. sample MSE ≤ O( α3
n2
)
Users w.r.t. population MSEpop ≤ O( α2n2 )
Table 1: Summary of error bounds for our AUC protocol for different splitting strategies and
analysis techniques.
Figure 5: Error incurred by our AUC protocol on two synthetic datasets.
In the second synthetic dataset “bench=ur” there are again 106 entries in the positive
class and the negative class, however here the si are drawn independently and uniformly from
[0..d− 1]. Here the error is much lower, this is because (i) the algorithm does not explore
any of the lower sections of the tree and so no recursion error is incurred whilst exploring
it and (ii) within intervals that are discarded the points are uniformly distributed so the
estimation of the AUC within that interval as a half is effective. Both of these effects will
occur approximately whenever the data is smooth so one can expect the algorithm to do
better in the case of smooth data than the analytic bounds indicate.
C Details and Proofs for 2PC Protocol
C.1 Proof of Theorem 5 and Discussion
Proof. The -DP follows from the Laplace mechanism and the simple composition property
of DP (observing that each input xi appears in exactly P pairs in P).
It is easy to see that Ûf,n is unbiased, hence we only need to bound its variance. We will
separate the part due to subsampling and the part due to privacy. To this end, we decompose
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Ûf,n into a noise-free term and a noisy term:
Ûf,n =
2
Pn
∑
(i,j)∈P
f(xi, xj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ûf,n,P
+
2
Pn
∑
(i,j)∈P
ηij. (24)
The noisy term is an average of independent Laplace random variables: its variance is equal
to 2P/n2.
The quantity Ûf,n,P is known as an incomplete U -statistic, whose variance is given by
Blom (1976):
Var(Ûf,n,P ) =
4
(Pn)2
(
E[f1(P)]ζ1 + E[f2(P)]ζ2
)
(25)
where ζ1 = Var(f(x1, X2) | x1)), ζ2 = Var(f(X1, X2), and f1(P), f2(P) are the number of
members of P × P which have exactly 1 (respectively 2) indices in common.
We first consider E[f2(P)]. Recall that P is constructed from P permutations σ1, . . . , σP
of the set {1, . . . , n}. As each index appears exactly once in each permutation, it suffices to
consider the self pairs within permutations and the overlaps across pairs of permutations we
get:
E[f2(P)] =
∑
i<j
P∑
p=1
E
[
qpij(P)
(
1 +
∑
p′ 6=p
qp
′
ij (P)
)]
,
where qpij(P) is the number of pairs from the permutation p that contain {i, j}. The probability
of a pair (i, j) to appear in a given permutation is 1/(n− 1), hence using the independence
between permutations we obtain:
E[f2(P)] = n(n− 1)
2
P
n− 1
(
1 +
P − 1
n− 1
)
=
Pn
2
(
1 +
P − 1
n− 1
)
.
For E[f1(P)], using a similar reasoning we only have to consider overlaps across each
pair of permutations, in which each index pair shares exactly one index with a single pair of
another permutation, except when the pair appears twice, hence:
E[f1(P)] =
∑
(i,j)∈P
2(P − 1)− 2
∑
i<j
P∑
p=1
∑
p′ 6=p
E
[
qpij(P)qp
′
ij (P)
]
,
= P (P − 1)n− n(n− 1)P (P − 1)
(n− 1)2
= P (P − 1)n
(
1− 1
n− 1
)
Putting everything together into (25) we get the desired result. 
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Optimal value of P . The optimal value of P depends on the kernel function, the data
distribution and the privacy budget. Roughly speaking, setting P larger than 1 can be
beneficial when ζ2 is large compared to 1/2. On the other hand, when ζ2 = 2ζ1 (which is
the minimum value of ζ2, corresponding to the extreme case where the kernel can in fact be
rewritten as a sum of univariate functions (Blom, 1976)), Var(Ûf,n) simplifies to 4ζ1n +
2P
n2
and P = 1 is optimal. In practice and as illustrated in our experiments, P should be set to a
small constant.
Optimality of subsampling schemes. The proposed subsampling strategy is simple to
implement and leads to an optimal variance, up to an additive term of 2
Pn
P−1
n−1 (ζ2 − 2ζ1) ≥ 0,
among unbiased approximations based on Pn/2 pairs. Note that this additive term is 0
when P = 1 or ζ2 = 2ζ1, and is in general negligible compared to the dominating terms for
small enough P . Optimal variance could be achieved at the cost of a more involved sampling
scheme.3 Alternatively, sampling schemes that can be run independently by each user without
global coordination (such as sampling P/2 other users uniformly at random) lead to a slight
increase in variance as users are not guaranteed to appear evenly across the sampled pairs.
C.2 Implementing 2PC
MPC is a subfield of cryptography concerned with the general problem of computing on
private distributed data in a way in which only the result of the computation is revealed to
the parties, and nothing else. In this paper the number of parties is limited to 2, and the
function to be computed is f˜(x, y). There are several protocols that allow to achieve this
goal, with different trade-offs in terms of security, round complexity, and also differing on
how the functionality f˜ is represented. These alternatives include Yao’s garbled circuits (Yao,
1986; Lindell and Pinkas, 2009), the GMW protocol (Goldreich et al., 1987), and the SPDZ
protocol (Damgård et al., 2011), among others. As some of the functions f˜ we are interested
in involve comparisons (e.g., Gini mean difference and AUC), a Boolean representation is
more suitable, as it will lead to a smaller circuit. Moreover, a constant round protocol is
preferred in our setting, as as users might have limited connectivity. For this reason we choose
garbled circuits as our protocol, for which (Evans et al., 2018) give a detailed description
including crucial practical optimizations. Moreover, we assume semi-honest adversaries in
the sequel (see Goldreich, 2004, for a definition of this threat model).
Circuits for kernels. We illustrate the main ideas on Gini mean difference and AUC. As
circuits for floating point arithmetic are large, they are usually avoided in MPC, to instead
rely on fixed point encodings. Hence, we assume that the parties have agreed on a precision,
and hence x, y are integers encoded in two’s complement.
For Gini mean difference we need our 2PC protocol to compute fgini(x, y) := |x− y|.
Let z be x− y, let zk−1, . . . , z0 be the binary encoding of z, where the bitwidth k will be a
constant such as 32 or 64 in practice, and let s = zk−1 · · · zk−1 be the sign bit of z replicated
k times. Then fgini(x, y) can be computed as (z + s) ⊕ s and, thanks to the free-XOR
3In addition to having each data point appear the same number of times in P, one must ensure that no
pair appears more than once.
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optimization of garbled circuits (see Evans et al., 2018), the garble circuit evaluation requires
only a subtraction and a summation, and thus is very efficient.
For AUC we need our 2PC protocol to compute fauc(x, y) := x < y, which requires a
single comparison and thus a small number of binary gates to be evaluated in a garbled
circuit.
Circuits for local randomizers. The above circuits need to be extended with output
perturbation corresponding to the Laplace and randomized response mechanisms discussed
above. An important observation when designing efficient circuits for these tasks is the
well-known fact that a random bit with bias 1/p, for any integer p, can be generated from only
two uniform random bits suffice, in expectation. Generating a uniformly random bit is easy
(and extremely cheap using garbled circuits) in the semi-honest model: each party simply
generates a random bit, and then inside the circuit a random bit is reconstructed as the XOR
of two bits. As XORs are for free in garbled circuits this computation is very efficient. The
problem of implementing differentially private mechanisms in MPC was discussed by Dwork
et al. (2006), where the authors present small circuits for sampling from an exponential
distribution requiring only a log(k) biased random bits, which can be constructed in parallel.
Recently, Champion et al. (2019) proposed optimized constructions for several well-known
differentially private mechanisms (including the geometric and Laplace mechanisms), and
empirically showed their concrete efficiency.
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